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''Within Ourselves ... ''
The Developm.ent of British Light
Infantry in North America During the
Seven Years' War
Ian McCulloch
" ... I am convinced. that till we have everything necessary. for carrying on the War
here. within ourselves. Independent of Aidfrom this Country. we shall go on very
slowly."
Lord Loudon to the Duke of Cumberland, August, 1756.

Introduction
he first British regulars to appear in North
America were those accompanying a small
British expedition to wrest Manhattan from the
Dutch in 1664. Colonel Richard Nicolls' troops
landed on Long Island 25 August 1664 at the
exact site where General William Howe's troops
would disembark over a century later. After a
swift Dutch capitulation, Nicolls' redcoats and
subsequent garrisons of British regulars would
maintain a solid presence in New York for a
virtually uninterrupted period of 119 years. 1

T

It has been suggested by one American
historian that this factual record has been
conveniently overlooked by most of his
colleagues in order that "the dismal episode of
Braddock's defeat" can figure prominently in
history books as the first appearance of British
redcoats on the North American scene. Thus
"they could be made to appear as stupid brutes
led by an eighteenth century Colonel Blimp while
American militia simultaneously appeared as a
keen and valiant yeomanry led by that paragon
of all virtue and destined military hero of the fight
for American liberty, George Washington. "2
His accusation is a valid one, but not very
surprising, as much of early American history
has become firmly embedded in myth, legend
©Canadian Military

and folklore. "Braddock's Defeat," "The Massacre
at Fort William Henry," "The Boston Massacre"
and even "George Washington's Cutting Down
the Cherry Tree" have all served a variety of
purposes down through the centuries. All have
become part of the "usable past" and have been
extensively deployed in any discussions of one
of those favourite themes of North American
historians -the conflict between European and
colonial values and methods. Inevitably
European warfare vs. North American warfare
(la petite guerre) has been drawn into the mythic
vortex. :l Canadian historian l.K. Steele writes that
"North American pride in the ways of the New
World has often led to the assumption that, in
warfare as in everything else, the new men of
the New World were better than the history-laden
men of the Old." Braddock's defeat more than
any other engagement of the Seven Years' War
has, "with some misrepresentation," been used
as key evidence to support this assumption of
superiority. 4 Stanley Pargellis reinforces this view:
Military historians hold that Braddock's defeat
taught a lesson badly needed for the time: you
cannot employ parade ground tactics in the
bush. To almost everyone who in one
connection or another remembers Braddock.
this episode stands as a conflict between Old
World and New World ways, with the outcome
justifying the new. 5
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However, many historians led by Pargellis,
with Paul Koppermans, Ian Strachan, and
Steele in close support, stress that Braddock's
defeat can no longer be perceived or used as
such. 6 While broad generalizations about the
utility of close-order formations in woods or the
cunning and ruthlessness of Indian tactics or
the command abilities of the young Washington
may all be still true, they are not true as
inferences from Braddock's defeat. The general
consensus now is that Braddock's debacle was
precipitated in large part by his critical neglect
on the day of battle to observe the fundamental
rules of war laid down in the European manuals
of the day. His leadership lapse and
complacency once nearing his objective meant
that his soldiers were never given a chance to
demonstrate that Old World methods, properly
applied, might have very well won the day. 7 His
column from the day it launched into the North
American wilderness adopted well-conceived
and generally well-executed security measures
as per the manuals. On the day however, these
careful measures were inexplicably not ordered
nor implemented by Braddock and his staff and
their absence was enough to ensure the ruin of
their army and give British officers a reputation
for ineptitude under frontier conditions. 8
This reputation is undeserved, for British
regulars took especial care to prepare
themselves for the American theatre, including
Braddock and subsequent commanders. After
Braddock's defeat no inferior guerilla force
would ever overcome any substantial body of
British regulars during the Seven Years' War in
North America.

Cromwell's time, took on a new vitality in
America. Each colony, as it became established,
was obliged to create its own militia for
protecting and extending its frontiers.
Cooperation amongst the militias of the various
colonies was confined to specific expeditions in
which two or more colonies had a mutual
interest. Organized into units by county or
township, the militia rarely fought as formed
units. Instead, the local unit served as a training
and mobilization base from which individuals
could be selected for active operations. 10
The effectiveness of the colonial militias
varied from bad to very good, their prowess
increasing proportionately to their proximity to
the Indian frontier and the no-man's-land
between New England and New France. The
seventy year struggle for the North American
continent commencing in 1689 consisted, in fact,
of four separate wars. The first three: the War of
the League of Hapsburg ( 1689-1697). the War of
the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) and, the
War of the Austrian Succession (1744-1748),
were fought by the colonists of both mother
countries using colonial methods and military
resources to hand. The French utilized their
Indian allies from the outset and armed them
with muskets. The American frontier militias
were thus forced to assimilate the best features
of Indian tactics in order to effectively counter
their enemy: small-unit operations, loose
formations, informal dress, swift movement, fire
discipline, ambush and surprise attack. Aided
by a greater population base and their own
Indian allies, many American frontiersmen
became adept at marksmanship, a skill which
increased as more accurate weapons were
developed. 11

"BB"- Before Braddock

T

he first English settlers in Virginia and New
England arrived with a minimum of
professional military support. In 1607, the
Jamestown settlers heeding Captain John
Smith's advice formed" .. .immediately into three
groups: one to erect fortifications for defence,
one to serve as a guard and to plant a crop, a
third to explore." 9 They encountered hostile
Indians almost immediately and, for many
decades, had to rely on standing militia forces.
Ironically, this ancient British tradition of the
militia, on the decline in England since Oliver

Russell Weigley, an American military
historian, states. however. that "as the frontier
receded. the inhabitants of older communities
gradually lost their skills in shooting. forest lore.
and Indian fighting. More and more the militia
of long-settled communities had to rely not on
frontier experience but on European military
manuals to guide them in their training. " 12
Orthodoxy advanced to such an extent that at
the outbreak ofthe Seven Year's War (The French
and Indian War to the Americans), militia
commanders were being advised by Colonel
Washington to study war from Humphrey Bland's
Treatise on Military Discipline, the leading
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Above: Indian auxiLliary with scalp. by Brigadier
General George Townshend. ca.l 759.
(Author's collection)

Right: An Iroquois Warrim: He is formidably armed
with a ball club, iron-headed tomahawk and a
J1intlock. Note the snowshoes, which would greatly
increase his mobility in the snow. and the enemy
scalp draped ouer the barrel of his gun.
(David M. Sieww'L Museum)

English tactical manual of the day. These
recommendations were no doubt based on
Washington's less than charitable opinions of
colonial militiamen as expressed in 1755:
Mililia, you will find ... never answer your
expectations. no dependence is to be placed
on them: they are obstinate and perverse, they
are egged on by the officers. who lead them to
acts of disobedience, and when they are
ordered to certain posts for the security of
stores, or the protection of the inhabitants. will,
on a sudden. resolve to leave them, and the
united vigilance of their officers can not prevent
the1n.'"

Washington was not under any illusions
either of their utility in forest warfare against
the French Indian auxiliaries. He wrote that
"without Indians, we shall never be able to cope
with those cruel foes to our country. Indians
are the only match for Indians; and without
these, we shall ever fight on unequal terms." 14
His views on colonial militia pre-dated one
British writer who wrote in 1758:

Our people are nothing but a set of farmers
and planters, used only to the axe and hoe [the Canadians] are not only well trained and
disciplined, but they are used to arms from
their infancy among lndians; and are reckoned
equal, if not superior in that part of the world
to veteran troops ... These [Canadians] are
troops that fight without pay - maintain
themselves in woods without charges march
without baggage - and support themselves
without stores and magazines ... "'

In general, the colonial militias before
Braddock were not useful unless fighting
directly in defence of their own homes and
families. Colonial expansion was mostly
accomplished by simple appropriation and
settlement - or dubious purchases and deals
rather than through any coordinated military
action by militias. Weigley concludes that "in
general, the colonial militias were not a reliable
instrument of offensive war distant from their
own firesides .... Militia training did not prepare
them for extended campaigns, nor did militia
organization befit the maintenance of long
43
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expeditions." 16 Thus, a long campaign
to distant fields that also involved
meeting Indian tactics of stealth and
ambuscade, was one for which
colonial militias (except ranger
units recruited exclusively from
frontiersmen) were eminently
unsuited and, moreover, one in
which they were unwilling to
participate. Governor Robert
Dinwiddie, however, knew
where to find men to meet the
challenge. He wrote to his friend
James Abercromby in England:
"I am still of Opinion without force
from Home, we shall hardly be able
to drive the French from the Ohio;
we want Military Men, and particularly
In gin eers." 17
Were the "Military Men," the British regulars,
equal to the task? Were they capable of waging
protracted campaigns in a virtual wilderness
against elusive adversaries well-versed in all
aspects of irregular warfare? Some perhaps were
not prepared for the ruthless savagery of scalping
and cannibalism encountered, but many soldiers
and their officers were well inured to irregular
warfare and skirmishing either from experiences
in Scotland or on the battlefields of Europe.
Various scholars argue that the modified
integrated infantry tactics that came to dominate
European battlefields from the middle of the
1 790s were primarily an organic European
development extending over the previous century.
These developments slowly but gradually
combined the techniques of linear formations
with those of irregular auxiliaries (Pandours,
Croats, Rangers et al), with regular specialists
in open order who were already members of the
line (light companies) and with elite units such
as jaegers and chasseurs. Colonial experience,
they argue, tended only to reinforce existing
trends already in train and not to initiate them. 18
The historical record bears this out, though it
will be seen that all three developments
simultaneously occurred within the British
infantry in North America during the Seven Years'
War.
The War of the Austrian Succession ( 17 401748) and the Jacobite Rebellion (1745-1746)
were the training grounds for most of the British

Marshal Maurice de Saxe. one of the "Great
Captains" oj 18'" century w'arrare. was
a proponent of light irifantry tactics.
(Print after a 1 7 48 portmil by Quentin
de La Tour. Photo: R. Chartrand.)

officers who served in North
America during the Seven
Years' War. It was the former
war in which irregular troops
were first employed on a large
scale by modern armies. 19 In
l 740-l 7 41, the young Austrian
Empress. Maria Theresa.
mobilized her Croatian and
Hungarian military borders (or
buffer zones) created to protect her
empire from the Ottoman Empire. The
Serb-Croat and Pandour troops thus
generated were then moved to the central front
for the first time in an attempt to eject Frederick
the Great's troops from Silesia. They performed
invaluable service in every campaign and by 1744
Field Marshal Traun had successfully forced the
Prussians out of Bohemia by constant attacks
on Frederick's supply lines and by harassing his
forage parties. Over 40,000 Serbo-Croatian
"Grenzer" would serve in the Hapsburg armies
during the War, increasing to about 88,000
during the Seven Years' War. These fierce
"irregulars" were usually dispatched on
independent operations against enemy outposts,
supply centres and lines of communication, but
some-times played a small part on the battlefield
as sharpshooters posted on the flanks. 20
The French army adapted to this new aspect
of warfare from the outset. The Bohemian
campaign brought Maurice de Saxe to the fore,
a subordinate general who, based on his
extensive experience with light troops in Eastern
Europe and as an author of the first modern
treatise to deal with the subject, raised a number
of compagnies ]ranches or "free companies" of
the French Army in 1744. He eventually
commanded five regiments of light troops during
the campaign, each combining infantry and
cavalry operating together. At Fontenoy in 1745,
Saxe used his light troops on the battlefield itself,
sending a screen of skirmishers against the
British centre while he deployed his army. He
also stationed Monsieur de Grassin's new 1200strong Regiment des Arquebusiers on his left
where their deadly independent fire or feu de
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The Chevalier Claude de Grassin led the
most outstanding light corps during the
Austrian Succession
War,
the
Arquebusiers de Grassin which
existedfrom 1744 to 1749.
(Prini aJier poriraii atlributed io
Duplessis. Photo: R. Chartrand.)

chasseur repulsed a British

attempt on that flank MajorGeneral J.F.C. Fuller writes
that "Grass in's troops were the
first true light infantry of
modern times, behaving
splendidly at Fontenoy and
deciding the battle of Mesle. 21
Saxe also used them at Lauffeldt,
against the British, who quickly
gained a great deal of respect for this
eighteenth century commander and
studied his writings on war carefully. 22
Flanders. where British soldiers fought
principally against French troops, exemplified
the same type of fighting that had characterised
warfare in Germany, Bohemia, Sardinia and
Italy. The traditional operations and ponderous
movements of armies, convoys and
detachments between the set-piece battles and
sieges were being increasingly affected by the
activities of irregulars in all theatres of
operations. Professionals in all armies
recognised that by the end of the 17 40s,
irregular light troops and regular light infantry
had a role in wartime, if only to defend one's
own forces against those of the enemy. The
British forces in Flanders were, therefore,
directly and continuously exposed to these new
tactical developments as practised by ally and
enemy alike.
The Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-1746
presented the British Army with some very
special problems of fighting in mountainous
terrain against a very agile, mobile and hardy
adversary. Highland clans were well-versed in
the guerilla raid, stealth and surprise and many
British commanders including Wolfe and Bland
were complimentary about their warlike skills
and tactical acumen. Fuller goes so far as to
say that the Black Watch in their first iteration
were an "irregular police" who, wise in the ways
of the Highlands, were the best-equipped light
troops to deal with Highland raiders and

robbers. 23 By Fontenoy, however, the
Black Watch were a regular heavy
infantry regiment of the line, albeit
equipped with a uniform that
allowed them greater mobility
as well as broadswords and
Highland pistols for closequarter fighting. 24
It was open field tactics at
Falkirk and Prestonpans by
the Highlanders, however, and
not the irregular warfare that
flared up on the periphery of the
Rebellion, that defeated the
conventional British infantry of
the day. In early 17 46, British forces
found themselves engaged in constant
irregular warfare; the Chevalier de
Johnstone, a Jacobite staff officer who served
with the Marquis de Montcalm at Quebec,
remarked that "Lord Loudon with his (Highland)
corps frequently harassed and annoyed
us ... keeping us continually on the alert."
However, Jacobite general Lord George Murray's
counter moves drove Loudon's men away from
their base at Inverness allowing Murray to
emerge and launch a series of surprise attacks
on Cumberland's outposts and supply lines.
Johnstone believed that "this bold enterprise
had a very good effect, and made such an
impression on the English that, conceiving
themselves insecure everywhere, they were
obliged to redouble their service in the midst of
winter." 25

Many Highlanders however soon came
to respect the ability of the English infantry or
"red soldiers" to function in mountainous
terrain and the professional behaviour of its
commander. On one occasion, General Bland,
author of the widely-used Treatise on Discipline,
marched with a force of regular horse and foot,
screened with a force of"Campbells before him"
as well as ''the Laird of Graunt [sic] and 100 of
his followers." Surrounded by fog, Bland
received word back of a possible ambush ahead.
He halted his column, took up defensive
positions and sent a heavily-armed detachment
forward to investigate. On the "all clear," Bland
went forward again assuming his previous
march discipline. 26

45
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"AB" - Mter Braddock
ritish commanders after Braddock found
that war in North America was essentially
one of geography with such vast problems of
communication and supply that their principal
task of generalship was simply in moving a force
of moderate size into contact with the enemy.
With the French on the strategic defensive, it
was the British and Americans who had to
penetrate hundreds of miles into trackless and
unsettled country.

B

American historians, John Shy and Pargellis
have underlined the problems of administration
and logistics throughout the War, and agree that
the aptitude of a few individuals for strategy
and tactics cannot be an adequate explanation
of success or failure in the North American
conflict. Shy observes that "the forces of nature
were so nearly overwhelming that the French
and Indian War had to be a war of organisation
and administration. It was a siege on a grand
scale. '027 Essential auxiliaries needed by any
general aspiring to take New France by the Lake
Champlain route included bateauxmen,
artillery and, especially, engineers. In Pargellis'

estimation, the requirement also included "a
small mobile force of trained officers and men,
with enough reserves to garrison captured posts
and maintain a lengthening line of
communication. In brief, the British needed a
small, highly trained army of experts, some of
whom could only be found in the colonies." 28
This, then, sets the stage for the arrival of
Braddock who has already been discussed and
provides our starting point. Shy notes that
"American conditions weighted the classic
tension of warfare- boldness versus caution,
surprise versus security - in favour of the
cautious approach. Only bad luck could nullify
the natural English superiority, and only
rashness or faulty logistics could enhance the
possibility of bad luck. "29 Braddock had
crippling supply problems, then lost his battle
through a single careless act. To future
commanders the message was clear: leave
nothing to chance and take no risks.
Braddock's successor was John Campbell,
Earl of Loudon, a Highlander officer well-versed
in irregular warfare from service during the
Jacobite Rebellion. Loudon's immediate task
was to build a serviceable army from the remains
of Braddock's regiments, garrison soldiers,
provincials, and new units from Britain, as well
as creating a logistical system during 1756-1757
that would form the basis of ultimate victory.
With Braddock's defeat fresh in everyone's
memory, Loudon was deeply concerned with how
his troops would fare in "the Bush fight in which
the [French) have so great an advantage by their
Canadians and Indians." Loudon was of the
opinion in late 1756 that "it is impossible for an
Army to act in this Country without Rangers,"
the latter a group of experienced frontiersmen
raised by William Shirley the year before for
reconnaissance and patrolling duties. 30 Led by
Robert Rogers, the Rangers were Americans, but
must not be confused with the American
provincial or militia regiments. Pargellis writes:
It is an easy fashion today to imagine that every
colonial was an adept in Indian warfare, or that if
they could not all follow a trail with Deerslayer's

Major Robert Rogers, commander of a unit that
specialized in irregular waifare and bush fighting.
(Author's Collection)

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/4

6

McCulloch: “Within Ourselves”: The Development of British Light Infantry in

Private, 60th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans),
ca.l 755-1 763. The regimentals consisted of red coat
and waistcoat, without the usual decorative lace
trimmings, blue coat cuffs, lapels, turnbacks and
breeches, pewter buttons, tricorn with white lace
and black cockade. Buff leather accoutrements and
armed with musket and bayonet. The white gaiters
were for dress parades. Brown "marching" gaiters
or green Indian-style leggings with red garters were
otherwise used.
(Print after reconstruction by

P. W. Reynolds. Photo: R. Chartrand.)

adeptness at least they knew some tricks of
the woods and could take care of themselves.
That is a fond delusion. Loudon would have
been only too glad if it had been true, if he
could have depended on colonial woodsmen to
provide for his command in America what
British troops could not provide - a knowledge
of the region and oflndian fighting .... But most
of the provincial army came from long-settled
communities which had never seen an Indian
in war-paint ... 31

Loudon's gloomy letter crossed one from the
Duke of Cumberland advising Loudon to "teach
your troops to go out on Scouting Parties; for
'till Regular Officers with men that they can trust,
learn to beat the woods, and to act as Irregulars,
you will never gain any certain Intelligence of the
Enemy."32 Loudon decided to use a combination
of regulars and rangers. Regulars were trained
to face both French regulars and irregulars
(Canadians and Indians).
Of particular note is Loudon's surviving
1756 training directive to his four battalion
commanders of the Royal American Regiment
(60th Foot). a new regiment raised in America
of which he was the first Colonel-Commandant.
The Royal Americans were ordered to dress
exactly like line regiments of the British army
less regimental lace but to train specifically for
their proposed role in forest warfare.
Instructions included firing "at Marks, and in
order to qualify them for the Service of the
Woods, they are to be taught to load and fire,
lyeing on the Ground and kneeling. They are to
be taught to march in order, slow and faste in
all sorts of Ground. They are frequently to pitch
& fold up their Tents and to be accustomed to
pack up and carry their necessities in the most
commodious manner. "33

Bush tactics and dress were soon put into
practise. British soldiers acting as a covering
party or vanguard learned to march in single file;
if they fell into an ambush, the command "Tree
all" was given and every man found a tree and
looked out for himself. Various suggestions were
made from time to time to make the regular
troops better fitted for the American milieu:
George Scott of the 40th (and later Amherst's
and Wolfe's commander of Rangers at
Louisbourg and Quebec respectively) devised
plans to lighten equipment and reduce firing
motions; James Prevost another Swiss-born
Royal American battalion commander who
shared with countrymen Henri Bouquet and
Frederick Haldimand a penchant for "la petite
guerre," went so far as to advocate the formation
of strictly American regiments, clothed for the
wilderness, armed with short, light guns, trained
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to swim, run and leap obstacles in
obedience to the blast of the whistle,
and to be accompanied by dogs for
chasing the Indians. 34

Loudon fell from grace at the same
time as Cumberland did in England
and was replaced by Abercromby
in the winter of 1757-1758.
William Pitt knew Abercromby
Loudon,
acting
on
to be weak and thus ensured
Cumberland's advice, sent 56
the Commander-in-Chief was
volunteer gentlemen from all
well-seconded by the dynamic
of his regular regiments to
and well-loved Brigadier Lord
Robert Rogers for intensive
George Augustus Howe. Howe
training on all aspects of
was described by Wolfe as
irregular warfare and "bush
"that great man" and "the best
fighting." According to Rogers,
soldier in the British army." 39
Loudon ordered him to instruct
American historian Francis
his charges "to the utmost of my
Parkman claims it was Howe that
power in the ranging discipline, our
"broke through the traditions of
methods of marching, retreating,
the service and gave it new shapes
ambushing and fighting, etc,
to suit the time and place."
that they might be the better
Howe studied forest warfare
General Jeffery Amherst
qualified for any future services
and joined Rogers's Rangers
(Author's Collection)
against the enemy we had to
on several raiding parties,
contend with .... "35
sharing all their hardships and making himself
one of them. The reforms he introduced were
Loudon's intentions in training regulars was
the fruits of this rough imposed schooling.
to turn them into a regular "light infantry corps"
British officers and men were ordered to "throw
according to Pargellis. 36 Major General James
off all useless encumbrances, cut their hair
Abercromby, Loudon's second-in-command and
close, wear leggings to protect them from briers,
destined to succeed him a few months later, was
brown the barrels of their muskets, and carry
openly supportive of the plan. He wrote that "the
in their knapsack 30 pounds of meal." Until
present Rangers ... might be reduced or brought
his untimely death during the approach march
down to reasonable terms of pay if a light infantry
on Ticonderoga in 1758, this veteran officer of
Corps was established which I am confident
Flanders (and defacto ground commander of
would discharge all the functions of Rangers in
troops in North America) effectively used
a short time, better than those in your present
rangers and light infantry to reconnoitre enemy
pay."37 In December 1757, however, Loudon
positions, screen the advance of heavy columns,
substituted this plan with the creation of a
protect those columns while preparing for the
regiment of lightly-armed infantry, "Gage's Light
assault, and in guarding the retreat. 40
Infantry" or the 80th Foot. Pargellis writes:
General Jeffery Amherst replaced
The importance of this move in the history of
Abercromby in autumn 1758 after the
irregular warfare is very great; it was the
Ticonderoga debacle, and, like Loudon and
natural and inevitable failure of the provincial
Howe, he formed and used light infantry units
rangers to fulfil the function of acting as
and continued to adapt the arms and equipment
irregular troops. Gage's regiment constituted
the first definitely light-armed regiment in the
of the regulars to wilderness conditions. He
British army; the firelocks issued to them were
ordered all regular battalion commanders in the
"cut shorter and the stocks dressed to make
winter of 1758-1 759 "to practise their men at
them lighter" Composed as far as possible of
firing at marks, whenever the weather permitted;
woodsmen, it was officered by men who [were
to form a company of men from each regiment.
trained in] Rogers' methods and were also
trained in regular discipline. Mter two years
and those to be the most active, with Proper
experience with local devices, the British army
Officers: These to be called the light infantry of
took partly into its own hands the function
the
regiments they belonged to ... " They were also
deemed to be most peculiarly American. 38
to be "dressed agreable [sic] to the pattern given
by the General, and armed with a carbine and
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bayonet only." 41 Amherst's younger
brother and ADC, William Amherst,
admired the active professionalism
of these particular regulars and
wrote in his journal that the
"Light Infantry are certainly of
great use & should always
accompany than Army in this
country, as these troops drive
them out of their shelter,
harass them continually&
treat them in their way." 42

The Light Infantryman's large tricorn
hat was to be cut down into a cap
"with as much black cloth added
as will come under his chin and
keep him warm when he lies
down." 44

Wolfe's professionalism and
common sense was born of
experience in Germany and
Flanders where he served from
1742 to 1745. In 1746 he saw
action at Falkirk and Culloden
and had held a small
By spring 1760, such was
independent command in hostile
the high calibre of training and
territory of the southern
skill of these troops that General
Highlands. Returning to Flanders
Amherst confidently sent his newlythe following year, he was
promoted brother to the
wounded at Lauffeldt and.
forefront of his force to
Major-General James Wolfe
when subsequently promoted
command these elite troops on
(McCord Musseum)
to Lieutenant-Colonel of the
the advance to Montreal. The
20th Foot, found himself with his regiment on
young Amherst proudly wrote that on one
forward reconnaissance-in-force "we lost our way
garrison duties in Scotland and southern
England. During that time he established
[back] & did not reach the Camp until after dark,
himself as one of the best trainers in the
through swamps & the thickest wood we could
contemporary British army for men and officers
meet with." He confessed to be glad of it "as it
shewed the temper of the Corps, expecting to lay
alike. Whereas most British regiments attached
out all night, without any covering or anything
little importance to target practise, Wolfe was a
firm believer in marksmanship being a decisive
to eat or drink. The bon volonte and cheerfulness
combat multiplier before ever setting foot in
I had before met with amongst them still
North America; in 1755, he wrote from Scotland
subsisted, & I conceive they know no difficulties.
It is a pleasure serving with such a Corps." 43
to a friend:
Major-General James Wolfe, who served as
one of Amherst's brigadiers at Louisbourg,
shared his superior's belief in the utility of light
infantry in North America. Wolfe was an energetic
reformer in dress, tactics and training of regulars
to meet the irregular warfare he knew would
plague the peripheries of his siege camps around
Quebec. Wolfe ordered that the ad hoc companies
of light infantry, first started at Louisbourg by
Amherst, remove their lace for his pending
campaign against Quebec. In addition, their
heavy redcoats were to be discarded in favour of
their waistcoats with the sleeves of their frock
coats sewn on as well as extra pockets for ball
and flint. Knapsacks were to be carried higher
and fastened with "a strap of web over the
shoulders, as the Indians carry their pack."
Cartridge boxes were to be carried hung under
the left arm, powder horns issued and slung on
the right, and tomahawks hung from the belt.

We fire bullets continually, and have great need
of them .... Marksmen are nowhere so necessary
as in a mountainous country; besides, firing
balls at objects teaches the soldier to level
incomparably, makes the recruit steady, and
removes the foolish apprehension that seizes
young soldiers when they first load their arms
with bullets. We fire first singly, then by files,
1,2,3, or more, then by ranks, then lastly by
platoons; and the soldiers see the effect of their
shot especially at a mark, or upon water. We
shoot obliquely. and in different situations of
ground, from heights downwards and
con trarywise. 45

Wolfe was a new breed of British army officer
who had made a thorough study of his military
profession, reading classical works, engineering
and drill texts, Marshal Saxe and, especially, the
latest French contemporary treatises on "la
petite guerre." Writing in 1756 to a friend seeking
expert advice and instruction for his brother
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entering the army, Wolfe recommended
the aspiring officer to read, amongst
others, "the Comte de Turpin's
book [Essai sur l'Art de la Guerre,
Paris, l 754] ... and a little
volume entitled "Traite de la
petite Guerre," that your
brother should take in his
pocket when he goes upon
out-duty and detachments. "46
Wolfe, on his return from
Louisbourg, was told by Pitt
that he would command the
Quebec
Expedition
and
immediately set about gathering
a cadre of experienced officers for
his Light Infantry Corps. He
wrote to Lord Sackville:

irregulars harassed the British army
with great success. After the
collapse and complete rout of the
French regulars from the field,
this same group of French
irregulars inflicted numerous
casualties on the British line
regiments who broke ranks to
pursue
their
regular
adversaries. It was only when
the Light Infantry moved
forward and the line regiments
reformed into company-sized
groups that they were finally
able to clear this last menace
from the battlefield."49

Thus during the Quebec
campaign, we have the
Colonel Henri Bouquet
synthesis of the "trained" light
(Author's Collection)
Carden the American has a
infantryman - a disciplined,
great deal of merit, but wants
regular soldier - proficient in all aspects of
bread to eat. He is an excellent fellow for the
irregular warfare but capable of falling back into
woods .... He is bold, circumspect and more
line
during a set-piece battle. This multiartful than his appearance bespeaks - has
talented
British light infantry under Howe and
experience in the method of the American war
beyond anybody that I can hear of; I hope we
Wolfe at Quebec anticipated by three decades
shan't lose such a subject so particularly
the French light companies of the Napoleonic
adapted to this sort of workY
period, the latter described by Peter Paret as "a
new all-purpose infantry, in which each soldier
From the time Wolfe's army landed on the
could fight in the line, in column, as a
lie d'Orlean and established fortified camps
skirmisher, and on detached missions. "50
around Quebec, the army's movements were
well-protected and screened by light infantry
The last refinement and proof of the
and rangers. Wolfe's orders to his light infantry
developmental progress of the British light
were explicit and succinct and, as the summer
infantry during the Seven Years' War was to occur
progressed, the intensity of the irregular warfare
at an obscure spot in the Pennsylvanian
increased to a point where Brigadier George
v.rilderness. At Bushy Run, a small force of regular
Townshend wrote that it was "A Scene of
soldiers comprising the light and grenadier
Skirmishing, Cruelty and Devastation. It is War
companies of the Black Watch, Royal Americans
of the Worst Shape."48
and Montgomery's Highlanders under Colonel
Henri Bouquet decisively routed a much larger
Wolfe's Light Infantry were also instrumental
Indian force utilizing company manoeuvre and
in assisting the main body to get up and onto
small unit tactics. Their commander was an
the plains of Abraham to conduct the main battle.
experienced Swiss officer, recruited from the
They landed first, took Vergor's Camp and the
Dutch service to be one of the four original Royal
Samos battery (both guarding the Foulon Cove)
American battalion commanders. Bouquet had
in reverse then, guided the main body to the
devoted his training abilities to "combining the
battlefield. These important duties completed,
qualities of a scout v.rith the discipline of a trained
they spent the rest of the battle guarding the
soldier" in all soldiers coming under his
vulnerable rear (Bougainville's force of 2,000
command. During his seven years in theatre he
men was at Cap Rouge) of Wolfe's army and
had strived to develop his men literally as
actually taking post in the line on the embattled
"hunters" (a direct translation of the German
left flank where a cloud of Canadien and Indian
"Jaegers") so they would be as adept as their
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Indian and coureur de bois adversaries. Bouquet
reminded readers in his personal account of the
Bushy Run engagement and subsequent
campaign that there wasn't "anything new or
extraordinary in this way of fighting which seems
to have been common to most Barbarians" and
offered numerous examples, not only from
antiquity, but from his own personal experiences
in Europe, pointing to light infantry formations
such as those raised by Marshal de Saxe and
Frederick the Great. "51 Fuller wrote that Bouquet
"studied Indian warfare not to copy it ... but to
discover its nature so that he might devise a
system of tactics whereby he could destroy it. "52
Bouquet identified general maxims that could
apply to all Indians and coureur de bois. First
they always " ... surround their enemy. The
second, that they fight scattered, and never in a
compact body. The third that they never stand
their ground when attacked, but immediately give
way, to return to the charge." It followed then:
lst. That the troops destined to engage Indians
must be lightly cloathed, armed and accoutred.
2nd. That having no resistance to encounter in
the attack and defence. they are not to be drawn
up in close order. which will only expose them
without necessity to a greater loss.
And, lastly, that all their evolutions must be
performed with great rapidity; and the men
enabled by exercise to pursue the''·
enemy
closely. when put to flight. and
not give them time to rally. 53

Bouquet's
training
program gave specific
attention to items such as
clothing, arms, training,
construction of camps and
settlements, logistics and
tactical manoeuvres to meet
most contingencies. Under his
tutelage, the company replaced
the battalion as the unit of
manouevre, troops learned
snapshooting, to fire from the
prone and kneeling positions,
wheeling on the run over broken
terrain, swimming, marching on
snowshoes. etc. An American
provincial observing Bouquet's training
regimen in 1758 before the march by
General Forbes on Fort Dusquesne
wrote: "Every afternoon he exercises his
men in the woods and bushes in the

manner of his own invention, which will be of
great service in an engagement with Indians. "54
It was not until Bushy Run in 1763 during
Chief Pontiac's Indian uprising, however, that
he got his chance. Quickly forming a disciplined
defensive perimeter on the first day, Bouquet
feigned a weakness in his line on the second
day to lure the Indians forward. Then, utilising
terrain- a gully of dead ground- Bouquet sent
two light companies up to hit the massing
attackers from the right flank. Completely
surprised, the Indians were driven at the point
of the bayonet across the frontage of two other
companies waiting in ambush - who opened
fire with deadly precision. The Indians were
completely routed.

Bushy Run was a decisive action, in spite of
the small numbers engaged, as it proved to be
the turning point in putting down Pontiac's
Uprising. It had a powerful dampening effect on
the involved Indian tribes' fighting ardour and
no further major actions or attacks were mounted
during the rebellion. Bouquet's success at Bushy
Run still stands in the annals of British military
history as "one of the fiercest ever fought with
Indians" with a codicil by Fortescue as to
Bouquet's military genius stating that "had any
man of less experience in such wwjare been in
command (emphasis mine), its issue might well
have been disastrous. "55
Fuller, a well-read military
historian, is also explicit,
stating that Bouquet's
tactics and manoeuvre against
"a savage foe is probably the most
ingenious and effective that the history
of irregular warfare has to record. "56
Fortescue generously gives the
soldiers equal billing when he states:
"the final stratagem whereby
A private of Goreham's Nova Scotia
Rangers according to a French
description of 1 755 which mentions a
short grey coat and a leather cap.
Ranger and light infantry units raised
in North America during the Seven Years'
War were usually outfitted with caps.
short coats of various colour such as
brown, green and blue as weLl as grey, with
.Indian-style gaiters and moccasins.
(Reconstruction by G.A. EmbLeLon.
Courtesy. Dept qf NaLionaL DE;Fense.)
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success was won reflects equal credit on the
resource of the commander and the perfect
steadiness of the men." 57 Bouquet modestly
attributes all to his men; "I cannot sufficiently
express my admiration for the cool and steady
behaviour of the troops who did not fire a shot
without orders, and drove the enemy from their
posts with fixed bayonets. The conduct of the
officers is much above my praises. "58

Conclusion

Military pedants in London, having grown fat
on the stiff mechanical drill of Prussia. could
not and would not bring themselves to believe.
in spite of the late wars. that light troops were
not only an aid, not only a necessity, but an
integral part of all skilfully organised armies ..
Nevertheless, a change was taking place, for
as in France, so also in England, pipe-clay.
hair-grease and the clockwork manoeuvres of
the drill square, though they cramped the
efforts of the few able soldiers who still sought
to carry on the traditions ofWolfe and Amherst,
of Howe, Bouquet and Rogers. they could not
completely cripple them. 0 '

In l 771, a company of light infantry was re'"J""he new light infantry tactical organizations
1. and skills acquired by the British army in introduced to every battalion throughout the line
regiments, though some had unofficially
North America during the French and Indian War
maintained a flank company in addition
went the way of all new innovations when
-·•2't,,,, to the grenadier company known as the
peace was achieved. "As must needs be at
~'-'~picket or Highland company. 62 Fuller
the close of every war, the [Prime
~
·- believes that this addition of "light
Minister's l first duty was the reduction
companies" at this time, however, was little
of the army to peacetime establishment,
more than nominal "window-dressing" as
which was effected by disbanding or
most light companies were "looked on as
dooming to disbandment all Infantry of
penal settlements and were filled with the
the Line junior to the 70th Foot and
worst characters of the battalions. "63
all Cavalry junior to the 18th Light
Dragoons. "59 Thus the 80th Regiment
of Light Armed Foot (Gage's Light
Itwas
recognized
Infantry) disappeared, though they
T~Uiii~
in 1774,
had a year's grace when Pontiac's
just
one year
Uprising broke out and Amherst,
before
Lexington,
that
desperate for troops, kept them on
these
"light
companies"
were
so
strength for the duration of the
poorly
trained
and
ignorant
oftheir
conflict. The 60th Foot (Royal
duties that General William Howe,
Americans) survived and became
on the order of King George III, was
the principal guardians of the
obliged to form a camp at Salisbury
frontier, but were broken up into
Plain for the instruction of seven
small detachments garrisoning
companies of light infantry in
myriad, small forts "in the
certain manoeuvres of his own
wilderness, hundreds of miles
developed while commanding
from any civilised settlement, illWolfe's Light Infantry. 64
fed, ill-provided, ill-cared for in a word forgotten. "60 One
Shy, in his excellent study of
might add ill-exercised and illwhat
role the British army played
trained.

j~~~~~~~~~~~j>-"

In 1763, all the light
companies in the British
army were disbanded. The
tactical system of Frederick
the Great was still in place
and still exerting its
pervasive influence. Fuller's distress as a
modern military man vice historian is evident
when he wrote:

Left & Opposite: Privates qf a
British regular army light infantry
company. 1770's. Note the special
dress and equipment oj these men.
They wear caps instead oj tricorns and coatees
instead of long tailed coats, and are equipped with
a powder horn.
(Sketches by PJ. de Loutherbergh. Anne S.K. Brown
Military Collection. Brown University. Providence. R.I.
Photo: R.Chartrand.)
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in the coming of the American
Revolution, has more than adequately
pointed out that the army and its
political masters in Whitehall were
confused as to what their actual
new role was to be in their newly
acquired American empire. He
asks:
What was [Shy's emphasis] the army
doing in the colonies? No one seemed
to know. Defense - as is so often the
case when no one is attacking -looked
a little ridiculous. The plan for Indian
management. not quite defense in the
usual meaning of the word. was
difficult to grasp .... And there was
always the hint of duplicity - that the
British government wanted an army not
to defend but to control the colonists. J'r\:~~~~
The hint concealed a grain of truth, but
what seemed a half-hearted attempt to
garrison the backcountry led Americans
to suspect more was there. 65

The disbandment of the light
infantry organizations which were best
suited to act as a potent gendarmerie
on the fringes of a wild and
unpredictable frontier left the typical
Frederician-style heavy infantry
battalions concentrated mainly in
urban and well-colonised areas of the
Thirteen Colonies and the former New
France. Thus, an accumulated wealth
of light infantry tactics and expertise
specific to the North American theatre, carefully
cultivated at first by Loudon, Rogers, Howe and
Amherst, then honed to a fine degree by Wolfe
and Bouquet, was lost by the absence of a
clearly defined role for the infantry in America.
From overseas, a new peacetime political
administration meant a return to orthodoxy and
adherence to Frederician tactics to maintain the
status quo.
This confusion of role coupled with economic
restrictions are the main reasons why welltrained and effective light infantry was not readily
available as it might have been in the British
army at the outbreak of the American Revolution
more than a decade later. During this latter
conflict, the tactical successes gained by the
Americans were nearly all in irregular fighting,
which have been seized upon by American
historians as proof of war-waging superiority. By

the middle of the war, British light
infantry had re-invented itself and
along with light cavalry had become
the equal or betters of the American
backwoodsmen and sharpshooters,
Fuller writing that "during the last
three years of [the war] the
English had so well adapted
themselves to its nature, that they
were in no way inferior to their
opponents " 66 Despite tactical
successes of the Americans in
irregular warfare fought on the
periphery,
it was
George
Washington's Continental Army,
however, assisted by French troops
and the French navy using standard
European tactics and siege warfare
of the day, that defeated the British
army strategically in North America.
Steele is correct in noting that
"North American pride in the ways of
the New World has often led to the
assumption that, in warfare as in
everything else, the new men of the
New World were better than the history
laden men of the Old." Many American
historians have used the defeat of
Braddock and the Americans' later
successes in the American Revolution
"with some misrepresentation ... as
evidence of this superiority. "67 What is
very clear that the British army came and
forced its kind of war on the Northern American
wilderness in the Seven Years' War and adapted
very quickly to its peculiar brand of partisan
warfare. The majority of its commanders were
aware of, and, in certain cases, innovators and
experts in irregular warfare, quickly creating
ranger units, light infantry companies and
battalions (with parallel improvements in dress,
equipment and tactics) to effectively counter the
Indians, Canadians and the French with skill
and confidence.
The mvth of American superiority of arms
in irregula~ warfare and its overall contribution
to the Americans' ultimate victory during the
Revolution has been highly exaggerated. This
"misrepresentation," as Steele has termed it,
serves to partially explain why the achievements
of British commanders in developing a highly
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effective light infantry during the Seven Years'
War in North America have been ignored or
given scant attention by American historians.
To recognize the facts would explode the
"superiority" myth.

11.
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